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Abstract
Expert judgments are a necessary part of environmental management. Typ-
ically, experts are defined by their qualifications, track record, professional
standing, and experience. We outline the limitations of conventional defini-
tions of expertise and describe how these requirements can sometimes exclude
people with useful knowledge. The frailties and biases in expert judgments
can interact with the social status afforded to experts to produce judgments
that are both unassailable and wrong. Several approaches may improve the
rigor of expert judgments; they include widening the set of experiences and
skills involved in deliberations, employing structured elicitation, and making
experts more accountable through testing and training. We outline the most
serious impediments to the routine deployment of these tools, and suggest
protocols that would overcome these hurdles.
Introduction
Applied ecology and conservation depend on expert
scientific judgments (Burgman 2005; Patterson et al.
2007). Recent developments in ecology and environmen-
tal management have explored different methods for for-
mally obtaining and combining expert estimates (Mar-
tin et al. 2005; MacMillan & Marshall 2006; James et al.
2010). However, the questions of who should be included
in the set of experts, and how expert judgments should be
verified, remain open.
A person’s formal training and technical knowledge
(known as their ‘substantive’ expertise; Stern & Fineberg
1996; Walton 1997) often are contrasted with the knowl-
edge of people with no formal training (known as “lay”
knowledge). Expert judgments are attractive when time
and resources are stretched, and are especially important
where existing data are inadequate, circumstances are
unique, or extrapolations are required for novel, future
and uncertain situations.
Because decisions may create “winners” and “losers,”
both the decisions themselves and the expert judgments
that support the decisions may be controversial, prompt-
ing arguments about who is an expert and how experts’
opinions should be used. This is especially so when ex-
perts are called upon to advocate on behalf of stakehold-
ers (Dryzek 2005) and to contribute to legal proceedings.
Decisions involve matters of fact and matters of
value (Stern & Fineberg 1996; Gregory 2002; Walshe &
Burgman 2010). Although fact and value cannot be sep-
arated entirely, we are concerned primarily in this ar-
ticle with the role of experts in estimating facts. If de-
cision making in conservation biology were an entirely
objective, detached scientific process that led inexorably
to a single, rational outcome, definition of expert status
would not be problematic. Ideally, there would be a pool
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of people with appropriate qualifications, extensive ex-
perience, and sound technical skills who could be called
upon to dispense judgments in a consistent manner.
Unfortunately, this is rarely if ever the case. Social the-
ories take a wider view, seeing expertise as distributed be-
yond conventional experts, and being sensitive to context
(Carr 2004; Evans 2008). In most practical situations, the
pool of potential technical experts is small, composed of
people with overlapping training, knowledge, and expe-
riences, so their judgments are not independent. In addi-
tion, expert judgments may be compromised by values
and conflicts of interest (Krinitzsky 1993; Shrader-
Frechette 1996; O’Brien 2000). For example, Campbell
(2002) found clear evidence of value-laden biases in ex-
pert judgments for marine turtle conservation.
Kahneman & Tversky (1982; see also Fischhoff et al.
1982; Slovic 1999) demonstrated that experts and lay
people are sensitive to a host of psychological idiosyn-
crasies and subjective biases, including framing, avail-
ability bias, and social context. Despite their weaknesses,
expert estimates of facts are generally better than lay esti-
mates, within the expert’s area of expertise (see Shanteau
1992; Slovic 1999; Burgman 2005; Garthwaite et al. 2005;
Chi 2006; Evans 2008 for reviews). Unfortunately, ex-
perts stray easily outside the narrow limits of their core
knowledge, and once outside an expert is no more
effective than a layperson (Freudenburg 1999; Ayyub
2001). Additionally, experts (and most other people) are
overconfident in the sense that they specify bounds for
parameters that are too narrow, thereby placing greater
confidence in judgments than is warranted by data or ex-
perience (Fischhoff et al. 1982; Speirs-Bridge et al. 2010).
The purpose of this article is to address the problem
of defining expertise in conservation and suggest ways it
could be improved. The conventional approach to defin-
ing experts is by their qualifications, track record, profes-
sional standing, and experience. We describe how these
requirements can sometimes exclude people with use-
ful knowledge, explaining how the frailties and biases of
expert judgments interact with the social status some-
times afforded to experts (Evatts et al. 2006) to pro-
duce judgments that are both unassailable and wrong.
We then evaluate approaches to the use of experts that
will improve the reliability of their judgments. These in-
clude widening the set of experiences and skills involved
in deliberations, employing structured elicitations, and
making experts more accountable through testing and
training (we do not evaluate the literature on aggregating
the opinions of different experts, which previously has re-
ceived thoughtful reviews; Wallsten et al. 1997; Clemen
& Winkler 1999). Our ultimate aim is to identify tools
and strategies that will improve the quality of scientific
expert opinion in conservation, highlight impediments
to their use, and suggest approaches that will encourage
their routine deployment.
Scientiﬁc authority, objectivity, and trust
The public, the courts, statutory bodies, and other de-
cision makers accept expert opinions because they be-
lieve experts have specialized knowledge not available
to all, obtained through training and experience, proven
by track records of efficient and effective application
(Hart 1986; Gullet 2000). Scientific experts are a source
for rules and standards (Peel 2005), they estimate facts,
and they contribute to decisions to undertake activities
(Gullet 2000). The US National Research Council, for in-
stance, asserts that experts have indispensable substan-
tive knowledge, methodological skills, and experience
(Stern & Fineberg 1996). Yet despite the incorporation
of advisory panels in legal frameworks, legislation rarely
defines expertise or specifies the composition of expert
panels. The question then arises, how is expert status de-
cided and validated?
Expert opinions are sought in the trial and judicial
determination of cases when the areas are specialized
and held to be beyond lay knowledge (Fisk 1998, p. 3;
Preston 2006) or in situations when direct evidence is
unavailable or unattainable (e.g., Lawson 1900, p. 236).
Tests used to separate expert opinion from lay knowledge
to determine the admissibility of opinion evidence (Gans
& Palmer 2004) are a combination of credentials, techni-
cal “knowledge” and reputation, reflecting conventional
notions of expertise.
Qualifications, reputation, and membership in profes-
sional groups are common guides to expert status (Collins
& Evans 2007). The expert, recognized by professional
membership, is assumed to have privileged access to
knowledge and is deferred to in its interpretation (Barley
& Kunda 2006). Some professional bodies are accorded
the right of self-regulation in return for competence, in-
tegrity, and altruistic service (Cruess et al. 2004).
Expertise includes the abilities to communicate tech-
nical information to laypersons, synthesize knowledge,
understand the history and context of a debate, work
effectively with a range of people, and be familiar with
the conventions and jargon of a field (termed “interac-
tional” expertise; Collins & Evans 2007). Critically, be-
cause scientific analysis requires robust discussion, and
(in legal contexts) cross-examination, substantive experts
who are unable to communicate may be just as unquali-
fied as those without any substantive expertise. Effective
communication is especially important when interactions
with stakeholders are designed to foster broad acceptance
of a proposed action (the “instrumental” value of partici-
pation; Stern & Fineberg 1996).
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One of the problems with this system is that experts
assume a position of authority, reinforced by professional
membership and status. It can intimidate people who
wish to examine expert judgments critically (Walton
1997), leading to a culture of technical control in which
expert opinions are rarely challenged successfully (Wal-
ton 1997). For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada
noted that expert opinion “dressed up in scientific lan-
guage” may appear “virtually infallible” (Gans & Palmer
2004, p. 244).
Many people have a view that knowledge held by
suitably qualified experts is a clear, objectively defined
“truth,” while knowledge held by stakeholders and the
public is fuzzy, oversimplified or corrupt (Hilgartner
1990). We see this as a flawed characterization that may
erode public trust in decisions, exacerbated by percep-
tions that experts are overconfident (see Krinitzsky 1993;
O’Brien 2000; Yearley 2000; Cruess et al. 2004; Barley
& Kunda 2006). The remainder of this article examines
ways of improving the definition and use of technical
expertise.
Broadening the deﬁnition of expertise
Another common (and in our view, misconceived) dis-
tinction is that lay knowledge is grounded in real world,
operational conditions while technical expertise is based
on narrow professional perspectives or theoretical as-
sumptions (Sternberg et al. 1993; Wynne 1996). Informed
amateurs and “lay experts” feel as though their evi-
dence is specific, concrete, and sensitive to local realities
(Beck 1992; Yearley 2000; Irwin 2001), and they expect
“outside” experts to be general and abstract (Gregory &
Miller 1998; Leadbeater 2003).
The broader view from social science is that differences
between lay and expert knowledge depend on the type
of problem, the person applying that knowledge, and the
cultural context in which that knowledge is learned and
applied (Verran 2002; Carr 2004). Knowledge can be clas-
sified as “expert” or “lay” depending on the interests it
serves, the purposes for which it is harnessed, or the
manner in which it is generated (Agrawal 1995). Moti-
vational biases and conflicts of interest are difficult issues
(Slovic 1999). Scientific experts advocate a scientific po-
sition, albeit based upon an accepted range of data and
methodologies, and they may do so on behalf of a client,
such as a proponent for a particular project or decision
(Barley & Kunda 2006). In other words, knowledge is
contextual (see Broks 2006). We agree with Jasanoff
(2006), Broks (2006), Evans (2008), and others that, in
many cases, it is not possible to delineate sharply between
expert and lay knowledge.
Collins & Evans (2007) classified several forms of ex-
pertise, ranging from specific instruction to contribu-
tory expertise, the pinnacle of substantive knowledge
(Table 1). None of these categories depend exclusively on
formal qualifications or professional membership. That is,
the reviews and tests of expertise outlined above substan-
tiate the view that expertise is real, but that it is more
widely distributed than conventional qualifications and
often associated with membership of social groups (which
may or may not be professional groups).
Local residents and resource users often are potential
experts in the context of environmental management
planning efforts that involve conservation biologists,
ecologists, and other technically trained scientists. Collat-
eral benefits of broader definitions of expertise include
both improved factual estimates and broader acceptance
of decisions. Failing et al. (2007), for example, demon-
strated the benefit of considering local sources of knowl-
edge in the context of relicensing a hydroelectric facility
in British Columbia, Canada. Both conventionally de-
fined technical expertise and “lay” knowledge, drawn
from area residents and from members of a local abo-
riginal community, were used to construct values hier-
archies, to understand causal pathways and to evaluate
the consequences of the response of the river system to
proposed flow changes. This structured, deliberative ef-
fort led to an adaptive management approach attractive
to a diverse group of technical and public stakeholders.
We conclude that managers should avoid arbitrary,
sharp delineations of expertise, and instead include a pro-
cess to examine knowledge claims critically (Gregory et al.
2006). We outline below three methods for testing claims
of expert status.
Making the most of expert judgment
The importance and pervasiveness of expert judgments
in conservation biology create an imperative for acquir-
ing judgments that are as accurate and well calibrated
as possible. Given the frailties and limitations of expert
judgments and the narrow conventional definitions of
expertise, what can be done to improve the situation?
Essentially, there are three options: to use analytical tests
to evaluate the skill and knowledge of potential contrib-
utors, to train experts, and to use elicitation procedures
that encourage participation and cross-examination of
evidence and that anticipate and deal with biases. These
are outlined briefly below.
Analytical tests
Cooke (1991) pioneered the idea of using hypothet-
ical and empirical data to measure objectively the
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Table 1 A taxonomy of expertise (modiﬁed from Collins & Evans 2007)
Type Characteristics
Contributory expertise Fully developed and internalized skills and knowledge, including an ability to contribute new knowledge and/or teach.
Interactional expertise Knowledge gained from learning the language of specialist groups, without necessarily obtaining practical competence.
Primary source knowledge Knowledge from primary literature includes basic technical competence.
Popular understanding Knowledge from media, with little detail, less complexity.
Speciﬁc instructiona Formulaic, rule-based knowledge, typically simple, context-speciﬁc and local.
aCollins and Evans used the term “beer-mat knowledge” for this category.
knowledge of experts. Essentially, the approach involves
asking experts for facts, a subset of which are known
to the facilitator but not to the experts (for instance,
facts from recent case studies, experiments, hypotheti-
cal scenarios, or simulations). Answers to these questions
provide information on the skill of the participants, in-
cluding their reliability (the degree to which an expert’s
assessment is repeatable and stable across cases; Wallsten
& Budescu 1983), accuracy, bias, and calibration (the fre-
quency with which subjective intervals enclose the truth;
Speirs-Bridge et al. 2010). Test results may be used to
evaluate knowledge, weight opinions, or exclude some
opinions altogether (e.g., Cooke & Goossens 2000; see
Morgan & Henrion 1990; Cooke & Goossens 2000; Hof-
frage et al. 2002; O’Hagan & Oakley 2004). Such appeals
for more explicit testing have also appeared in legal aca-
demic reviews (Schum & Morris 2007).
The prospect of doing this raises challenging questions.
Who sets and administers the tests? Which elements of
expertise should the tests examine? Where do the data
come from to validate the answers? How does one over-
come the fact that experts unused to being challenged
are likely to be reluctant to be tested? These tools have
been deployed and many of these hurdles overcome in
applications in law, meteorology, and engineering (e.g.,
Cooke 1991; Murphy 1993; see also Fischhoff et al. 1982;
Murphy & Winkler 1977; Hora 1992). A complete review
of these techniques and their implications is beyond the
scope of this review.
Feedback and training
If people have the opportunity to learn how to improve
their ability to judge, their performance generally im-
proves (Cooke 1991; Cooke & Goossens 2000). Typically,
training outlines a field’s jargon and theoretical concepts,
and uses case studies, experiments, hypothetical scenar-
ios, and simulations to illustrate processes relevant to
the questions at hand. This may include numerical and
graphical output derived from similar assessments and
different ways of representing uncertainty and probabili-
ties (e.g., Kadane et al. 1980; Cooke 1991; Chaloner et al.
1993; Garthwaite et al. 2005).
For people who are involved routinely in expert judg-
ment exercises, feedback allows them to see the results of
their earlier assessments, in relation to outcomes. Feed-
back protocols require procedures for administering and
disseminating the results of professional judgments and
test questions, so that experts improve their performance
over time (Cooke & Goossens 2000). Yet some situations
for which expertise is desired have few or no opportuni-
ties for feedback. An example is predictions for the social,
environmental, or health impacts of an emerging tech-
nology (e.g., nanotechnologies, Wintle et al. 2007); there
are few clear parallels, and the success of predictions will
not be known for decades (Pidgeon et al. 2008).
While training and feedback generally improve expert
performance, bias and overconfidence about facts may
persist through many repetitions of an elicitation exer-
cise. Practice and experience alone do not necessarily
remove biases. Improvement is usually slow and a large
number of similar assessments is needed to generate
substantial improvement. Feedback protocols have been
deployed in engineering risk assessments in Europe, but
it has taken many years to establish accepted procedures
(Cooke & Goossens 2000). We conclude that, even
though improvement is not instantaneous, systematic
feedback is the single most important factor demarking
domains in which expertise develops and improves
over time (e.g., chess playing, weather forecasting) and
domains in which it does not (e.g., psychotherapy)
(Dawes 1994).
Structured procedures
Structured elicitation procedures are explicit methods
that anticipate and mitigate some of the most impor-
tant and pervasive psychological and motivational biases.
One of earliest and still one of the most useful of these
tools is the Delphi technique (see Burgman 2005). In
it, experts make an initial judgment of a fact. The re-
sponses are shown to other participants, who then make
a second, private judgment of the fact. The group aver-
age may be weighted by performance on test questions
(Cooke 1991). The process circumvents or ameliorates
many problems associated with dominance, availability
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bias, overconfidence (Speirs-Bridge et al. 2010), and re-
lated effects. Participants may be given the opportunity
to discuss differences of opinion, allowing people to rec-
oncile the meanings of words and context (Regan et al.
2002), thereby removing arbitrary language-based dis-
agreements.
Law plays a critical role in challenging expert judg-
ment when evidence is presented in support of ad-
versarial positions (Christie 1991; Fisk 1998). Under
cross-examination, an expert’s efficiency, effectiveness,
veracity, credibility, and character may be attacked
(Christie 1991; Fisk 1998). The qualifications of an ex-
pert may be tested by the opinions of other experts. Ex-
perts may be tested by hypothetical questions or by proof
that on a former occasion, an expert expressed a different
opinion. This questioning has its origins in medieval tests
of peer judgment (Franklin 2001). We suggest that ad-
versarial tests of expert evidence in domains outside law
courts and tribunals will improve the reliability of expert
judgments (Franklin et al. 2008).
The structured elicitation processes outlined above pro-
vide a context in which opinions may be cross-examined
effectively. Participants have an opportunity to hear and
to weigh the opinions of others, integrating new informa-
tion, improving understanding of the question, and eval-
uating the context and motivations of other participants,
before arriving at their final judgment.
This process will work best when, as noted above, peo-
ple from a variety of social contexts and “positions” in
a debate are involved, providing a measure of protection
against motivational bias. Experts may be stratified by ge-
ography, technical background, experience, affiliations,
or other relevant criteria. Stern & Fineberg (1996) outline
objective methods for stratifying and selecting stake-
holder participants. Structured elicitation protocols pro-
vide an environment in which vigorous peer review and
debate, including cross-examination of competing claims,
may be captured effectively. Cross-examination of data,
models, and reasoning may then allow an independent
adjudicator to reach a final synthesis of evidence and to
form a conclusion (Franklin et al. 2008).
Conclusions
Our review suggests that conservation biologists could
contribute knowledge more effectively and enhance the
credibility of their decisions by embracing a suite of new
professional behaviors and wider definitions of expertise.
Specifically, the review suggests that the credibility, accu-
racy, and reliability of expert deliberations will improve if
explicit selection, testing, training, and feedback proce-
dures are deployed.
Opportunities for improved performance go beyond
recommendations for individual experts. To work ef-
fectively, the system in which experts work should be
structured to anticipate and deal with cognitive and
motivational biases, as described above. In particular, it
should ensure the selection of experts is inclusive and
transparent, and it should provide ample opportunity for
experts to be questioned critically by analysts, other ex-
perts, stakeholders, and others.
Our review of scientific authority suggests that what
counts as expertise depends on context. Expert per-
formance is likely to be affected in subtle and unpre-
dictable ways by motivations and psychology. If experts
are tested, then expertise from all domains may be con-
sidered, including what may be considered lay knowl-
edge. This accords with sociological theory of expertise as
real but “unequally distributed,” not simply determined
by formal qualifications and professional membership
(Evans 2008). There are several models for engaging a
wider cross-section of potential experts and numerous
collateral benefits may accrue from doing so (Carr 2004).
These observations lead us to recommend a set of general
prescriptions for involving experts in conservation. We
recommend the following prescriptions for the managers.
(1) Identify core expertise requirements and the pool of
potential experts, including lay expertise (pp. 1, 3).
(2) Create objective selection criteria and clear rules for
engaging experts and stratify the pool of experts and
select participants transparently based on the strata
(pp. 3, 5).
(3) Evaluate the social and scientific context of the prob-
lem (pp. 1, 2, 3).
(4) Identify potential conflicts of interest and motiva-
tional biases and control bias by “balancing” the com-
position of expert groups, with respect to the issue at
hand (especially if the pool of experts is small) (pp. 1,
2, 5).
(5) Test expertise, relevant to the issues (pp. 2, 4, 5).
(6) Provide opportunities for stakeholders to cross-
examine all expert opinions (pp 3, 5).
(7) Train experts and provide routine, systematic, rele-
vant feedback on their performance (p. 4).
At minimum, we recommend a formal, transparent
process for the definition and selection of those with rel-
evant expertise, the adoption of new professional stan-
dards that employ structured elicitation methods, testing
and feedback of expert judgments, aimed at improving
the performance of both experts and elicitation methods
over time.
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